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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Respondent. :
vs.

:

CHARLES LANGDON,

1

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 880370-CA

Priority 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant pled no contest to a charge of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
second degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3 (1987) because the charge is a second
degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether defendant is precluded from appealing the

denial of his motion to suppress when he subsequently entered an
unconditional plea of no contest to the charge.
2. Whether defendant has standing to challenge the
search of the box attached to the car which he was driving and
the seizure of the cocaine found in the box.
3.

Whether the troopers had probable cause to search

the box attached to the car thus making the search lawful.

4.

Whether the troopers' detention of defendant was

for a reasonable length of time.
5.

Whether the troopers' reliance on a judge's oral

authorization to search the box was a good faith reliance under
U.S. v. Leon.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the
following statutory provision:
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-4 (1982).
The text of this provision is attached in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(iv) (Supp. 1988), alleged to have occurred on March 17,
1988.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on April
6, 1988# with the Fifth Judicial District Court for Iron County.
The Honorable J. Philip Eves heard evidence and argument on the
matter on May 2, 1988, and May 17, 1988.

Based on the evidence

and Memoranda of Law submitted by plaintiff and defendant. Judge
Eves denied the motion in an order signed May 31, 1988. A copy
of the Order had been sent to counsel on May 23, 1988.

(A copy

of this Order is included in the Addendum.)
Trial in the matter had been set for June 3, 1988. On
June 1, 1988, defendant moved to continue trial pending an
interlocutory appeal but the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant discussed the matter with his counsel and changed his

plea to one of no contest.

Defendant signed a Statement of

Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain on that date.

(Copies of the

Minute Entry and Defendant's Statement are included in the
Addendum.)
On June 1, 1988, defendant was sentenced to a term of
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and no fine.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 17, 1988, at approximately 6:30 p.m., three
Utah Highway Patrolmen were travelling northbound on 1-15 near
Cedar City, Utah (R. 180 at 4, R. 181 at 14 and 30). The trooper
who was driving noticed two cars behind him which appeared to be
speeding.

He pulled over and turned on his rear radar to check

their speed (R. 180 at 4).

The second car, driven by defendant,

was clocked at 70 miles per hour and the troopers pulled it over
for speeding (R. 180 at 5).
Trooper Lee approached defendant, who was the sole
occupant of the 1978 Cadillac, and asked for his driver's license
and registration (R. 180 at 5). The registration did not list
defendant's name as owner of the car but instead gave the names
of Marvin (last name not in record) and Anthony Linear (R. 180 at
5, R. 181 at 17 and 31). The trooper became suspicious when the
car was registered to others and began to investigate (R. 180 at
5, R. 181 at 17).
Defendant told the troopers that the car belonged to
his stepson (T. 180 at 6). Defendant then told them that he was
buying the car but that it was registered to his stepsons for
insurance purposes (T. 181 at 18-19 and 29). Defendant said he
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had been buying the car for one-and-a-half years but had been in
possession of it this time for only a day or two (T. 181 at 19).
Defendant gave troopers a phone number in California to verify
permission for him to have the car but, when dispatch called,
there was no answer (R. 180 at 6, R. 181 at 21).
Defendant gave the officers a second number to call to
contact a woman named Fannie.

Dispatch called that number and a

woman named Sherry, who did not know defendant but knew Anthony,
answered.

She refused to give a phone number for Anthony but

offered to give him a message (R. 180 at 6, R. 181 at 21).
About 7:15 p.m. a man claiming to be Anthony Linnear
telephoned and said defendant had permission to use the car.

The

person calling was not able to say where defendant was travelling
but did say defendant had permission to drive the car (T. 180 at
6, T. 181 at 22 and 31).
During the time spent checking on the ownership of the
car, Trooper Lee asked defendant if he could look through the
car.

Trooper Lee asked defendant if he had any weapons or

contraband and defendant said no (T. 180 at 6, R. 181 at 14).
Defendant's response when asked if the Trooper could look in the
car was, MI don't care.

Go ahead" (R. 181 at 14). Defendant

even took the car keys out of the ignition and went to the back
of the car and opened the trunk.

Defendant then went and sat in

the patrol car with Trooper Bagley to keep warm (R. 180 at 7, R.
181 at 14-15).
In searching the car. Trooper Lee found a road atlas,
sleeping gear in the back seat, two small pieces of luggage in
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the trunk and ammunition for a .308 automatic pistol (R. 181 at
26).

He also found air freshners, two in the trunk and one in

the passenger compartment (R. 181 at 26). These air freshners
were not typical hanging car freshners but were for household
use.

One was a stick-on type for fixing to a wall and one a

liquid in a bottle (R. 181 at 35-36).
At about 7:00 p.m., before the purported owner of the
car was located, Trooper Lee looked under the rear of the car and
saw a black box (R. 180 at 8, R. 181 at 33). The box was three
to five inches by three to five inches by twelve inches and was
welded to the underneath of the car between the gas tank and the
rear bumper (R. 180 at 8-9, R. 181 at 15 and 23). The box had a
new padlock on it and was free of road dirt and grime and
appeared to be newly installed (R. 180 at 8 R. 181 at 15). The
trooper could see that there was something in the box but not
what it was (R. 181 at 20-21).

When he found the box, the

Trooper asked defendant if he could open the box.

Defendant

responded that he knew nothing about the box, that he did not
want to give permission, and that he did not have a key for the
padlock (R. 180 at 7, R. 181 at 19-20 and 38). The officers
asked for defendant's key ring to see if any keys fit and
defendant voluntarily handed them over.

One key fit the padlock

on the box but would not turn and open the lock (R. 181 at 20).
Later, after the lock was opened by other means, the troopers
found a key in the bottom of the car's glove box which fit the
padlock (R. 181 at 48). Because defendant disclaimed any
knowledge of or ownership in the box, the troopers had the
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dispatcher ask the purported owner when he telephoned if they
could open the box.

The person claiming to be Anthony Linnear

said he didn't know that a black box as welded to the bottom of
the car, he didn't know anything about it and would not give
permission to open the box (R. 181 at 22).
The troopers at that point felt that they had probable
cause to seek a warrant to open the black box.

This was based on

the following facts:
1.

The black box apparently newly welded to the

underside of the car (R. 181 at 23).
2.

Something was in the box but officers could not see

what (R. 181 at 20-21).
3.

Experience with hidden compartments in cars used to

transport contraband (R. 181 at 24).
4.

The new lock on the box and the road atlas and

paucity of personal items in the car (R. 181 at 24).
5.

The newly painted condition of the car and the new,

expensive tires on the car (R. 181 at 25).
6.

Sleep gear and fast food wrappers in the back of

the car (R. 181 at 25-26).
7.

Air freshners in the car which are often used to

mask the smell of marijuana and the ether used in manufacturing
cocaine (R. 181 at 26).
8.

The driver not owning the car and the ammunition

found in the car (R. 181 at 27).
The troopers then spent some time trying to find a
member of the Iron County Attorney's Office and a judge to try to

get a search warrant (R. 187 at 41-45).

In an attempt to comply

with Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-4 (1982), Trooper Bagley was placed
under oath and testified to the occurrences of the evening to
Judge Margaret Miller, the Cedar City Precinct Justice of the
Peace.

Judge Miller verbally granted authorization to search the

box but evidently a search warrant was never actually written or
signed (R. 180 at 10, R. 181 at 12). The search for the car's
owner and for a judge to issue a warrant took approximately two
hours and ten minutes (R. 181 at 39). The information used to
seek the warrant was transcribed and introduced at the
suppression hearing (R. 180, R. 181 at 51).
Based on the probable cause adduced, the troopers
picked the lock on the box and found seven ounces of 90% pure
cocaine (R. 181 at 47 and 42).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant has entered an unconditional plea of no
contest in this case and is thus precluded from raising the
suppression matter on appeal.
Because defendant's claim of ownership in the car is
nebulous and because of his disclaimer of ownership in the box
welded to the car, he does not have standing to challenge the
search of the box.
All of the factors enumerated by the officers, added to
their experience and training, gave them probable cause to
believe that the box contained contraband and made their search
valid.
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Under the circumstances the troopers detention of
defendant was reasonable.

A rigid time limit for detention has

been rejected by the courts and this Court must look at the
reasons for the detention to determine reasonableness.
The trial court held that there was not a valid search
warrant in this matter.

In spite of that, respondent contends

that the troopers relied, in good faith, on the verbal
authorization as a neutral magistrate to conduct the search of
the box.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT CANNOT APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AFTER HE HAS ENTERED AN
UNCONDITIONAL PLEA OF NO CONTEST TO THE
CHARGE.
Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine found in the
black box which was attached to the underside of the car which he
was driving.

When his motion was denied, defendant appeared

before the trial court two days before the trial and asked for a
continuance to file an interlocutory appeal.

After a brief

recess, defendant returned and entered a no contest plea to the
original charge (R. 169-170).
about the plea.)

(See Addendum for Minute Entry

Defendant also initialed and signed a Statement

by defendant Regarding Plea Bargain and his counsel and the
Deputy Iron County Attorney signed certificates indicating the
accuracy of the defendant's statement (R. 146-152) (See Addendum
for the full text of this Statement).

Paragraph 5 of the

statement indicates that defendant knew that he had the
Constitutional right to appeal his conviction if he were to be
_Q_

tried and convicted by a jury or by the court.

Nothing in the

record gives any indication that the No Contest p] ea entered by
defendant on May 1, 1988 was a conditional plea.

The court's

minute entry and the defendant's statement make no mention of a
conditional plea.

L
From the rurord it i i>
apparent thai

defendant's plea was entered unconditionally.
This Court recently addressed the issue of conditional
versus unconditional pleas i i :i the case of State v. Sery, 758 P. 2d
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

The Court reiterated the common law

rule that a voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant's right to
appeal an adverse suppressioi i i: uling.

Ki. at 938.

The Court

then said:
In Utah, this general rule regarding
forfeiture of appellate review of an adverse
ruling on a pre-plea motion to suppress
applies with equal force to a defendant who
enters an unconditional no contest plea,
which "if accepted by the court shall have
the same effect as a plea of guilty...."
Utah Code Ann, § 77-13-2(3) (1982). Accord
Cookery v. State, 524 P.2d 1252 (Alaska
1974); Jackson v. State, 294 So.2d 114 (Fla.
App. 1974); People v. New, supra.
Id at 938.

In the Sery case this Court reversed and remanded

because it found that Sery had entered his plea conditioned on
the right to appeal the pre-plea suppression.

The agreement in

that case between defendant and the prosecution and approved by
the judge allowed the appeal and a withdrawal of defendant's plea
if the appellate court reversed the trial court's suppression
ruling.
In the present case, there was no such agreement in the
record

All of the information in the record points to an
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unconditional plea on defendant's part.

He is thus precluded

from appealing the suppression ruling.
POINT II
DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THE BOX AND THE
SEIZURE OF THE COCAINE.
The car which defendant was driving was registered to
other people but defendant claimed he was buying it.

Someone who

claimed to be the owner of the car told the troopers that
defendant had permission to drive the car.

Defendant gave

permission to search the car but no evidence requiring
suppression was seized from the interior of the car or trunk.
However, when Trooper Lee knelt and looked under the car (a place
he lawfully had the right to be), he saw, in plain view, a
rectangular box newly welded to the car's underside.
defendant disclaimed any knowledge of the box.

When asked,

The purported

owner of the car also disclaimed any knowledge of the box.
The issue of standing was just briefly mentioned at the
suppression hearing.

The Deputy Iron County Attorney said the

State was not prepared to concede that defendant had standing (R.
181 at 10-11) and briefly argued the issue of standing at the
close of evidence (R. 181 at 58-59).

Defense counsel also

briefly argued the matter (R. 181 at 60) but neither counsel
cited any authority for their positions.

The trial court made a

cursory ruling that defendant had standing because he was the
driver (R. 181 at 63) but focused his questions on the good faith
exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1983) and the
automobile exception to search warrants under Chambers v.
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Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1969).

The State maintains that the trial

court # admittedly oi I the basis ot no case-law assistance from
counsel, erroneously found that defendant had standing.
Respondent contends that an individual has standing to
object to the lawful nee. s of a search only i. f he has a ""legitimate
expectation of privacy" in the item or premises searched.
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)

Rakas

A person who is aggrieved by

diri il legal seai i:h and sej zur e oi ily through the introduction of
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment
rights InfrInged, ' Rakas, 4 3 9 U S, at 134, citing Anderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).

The fact that the

defendant may have been "legitimately on [the] premi ses" in that
he may have been in the car wi th the owner's permission does not
determine whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the particular areas of the automobi ] e searched.
at 148.

Further,

H

Rakas, 439 U.S.

the proponent of a motion to suppress has the

burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the challenged search oi

fion/ure."

Rakas 439 U.S.

131 n. 1
The present case is similar t<> the recent case of State
v. DeAlQi

V 46 P.?<1 ll>4 (lit Ah t"i

App

Pi •

In that case, a

California man was driving a car registered to another man in New
York.

The driver gave consent to search the car and the officer

found a seer et compar tmei it :1 n 1 h e t;,i ui lk which held cocaine.

The

defendant in that case denied knowledge of the compartment and
its contents and presented no evidence at the suppression hearing
of hiB permi BBion to ho ve the car.
-11-

This Court addressed the issue of that defendant's
standing and ruled that he had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area searched.

Id. at 196-197.

This Court quoted

State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) as saying:
"[djefendant concede[d] that he did not own the car or the
attache case [found in the trunk] containing the evidence
complained of# and [therefore] failed to show that he had any
legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects searched."
at 196.

Id.

In DeAlo, as in the present case,
defendant denied any ownership in the car and
any knowledge of the secret compartment or
its illegal contents. The only substantive
evidence defendants presented at the
suppression hearing was the testimony of the
arresting officer that it was his
understanding Rafael Villa was using the car
with his brother's permission. No other
witnesses were called and no other evidence
was presented. It might be argued the
officer's testimony established some
expectation of privacy on the part of Villa.
That certainly does not establish an
expectation of privacy on the part of
defendant.

Id. at 196.

This Court held that the defendant may have had an

expectation of privacy in his own personal belongings in the car
but not in the car itself.

The defendant had not shown "a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the cocaine
was found.

Therefore, he had no standing to object to the

search....-

Iji. at 197.

Since in the present case defendant denied any
knowledge of the black box welded to the underside of the car and
did not produce any evidence at the suppression hearing of an
ownership interest in the car, he has not demonstrated that he

-i o_

had standing to challenge the seizure of the cocaine.
disciaimei

A

,1B treated as an abandonment of the proiperty •

See

United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1434, 71 L.Ed.2d 652
United States v. Miller, 589 F./d

1117 \1st

(1982);

Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771

(1979);

United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).
Abandoned property loses it.ft privacy expectation.

State v.

Austin, 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 1978).
POINT III
THE TROOPERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
THAT THE BOX CONTAINED CONTRABAND AND THEIR
SEARCH WAS LAWFUL.
Defendant gave the troopers permission to search the
car that he was driving but tried to withdraw consent when the
troopers found the black box welded to the underside of the car.
Defendant now claims that the troopers had n*. right

to search the

box.
The law is quite settled that automobiles do not have
the same protection from sear cl i tl lat houses do.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

See Carroll v.

This is based on the

mobility of the car, the fact that the people in possession of
the car aie alerted to the officers' interer*
the contents of the car may never be found ;
getting a warrant.

vii t h * > Irict that
: ime is expended in

See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)

ai .< :l State v. Limb # 581 P. 2d 142 (Utah ] 978)

If ai i officer has

probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband
the automobile may be searched without a warrant.
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Carroll v.

United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

In addition, if the officers

have probable cause to search the car the probable cause extends
to a search at the station house when the car is taken there.
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1969), and Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 67 (1975).

In the White case consent to search was

denied but officers searched anyway and the Court ruled that they
had probable cause to do so.

The Court held that the officers

had probable cause to search at the stop and the probable cause
still existed at the station house.

3^d. at 68.

The troopers in the present case had probable cause to
search the black box.

The initial stop for speeding was valid

and the defendant's consent to search the car was freely given.
In the car, the troopers found a road atlas, sleeping gear, very
little personal luggage (inconsistent with a trip across the
country to a new job), three air freshners of the household- not
car-type, and ammunition for automatic pistol but no gun.

The

car was not registered to defendant and defendant gave
conflicting stories about what, if any, ownership interest he
had.
As part of his search the trooper knelt and looked
under the car and found a rectangular black box newly welded to
the underside and newly painted with a new padlock on it.
could see something in the box but not what it was.

He

He asked

defendant and the purported owner of the car about the box and
both disclaimed any knowledge of it but refused to give consent
to open it.
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The trooper's experience and training had taught him
tha t: el r'uq smugg lers oi ten car i :i ed contraband i n o„l der cars which
were well cared for and had new tires.

Smugglers also often hid

the drugs in secret compartments and used household air freshner
to try to mask the odoi ol the contraband.

They travelled with

little luggage and with sleeping gear and ate at fast food
restaurants in order not to stay in one place too long.

The

presence of ammunition suggested the presence of a gun which may
have been hidden in the car.
The factors establishing probable cause to search in
this case are:
1

The troopers' experience and training in detecting

drug smugglers.
2,

A few personal belongings in the car.

3.

The questions surrounding registration and

own e r s h i p of the c ar.
4

The ammunition in the car.

5.

The air freshners in the car.

6

The new black box concealed under the car and its

new padlock.
7,

The disclaimer of knowledge of the box by defendant

and the car 's pur poi ted ownex ai id their refusal to allow a search
of the box.,
8

The fact of something being in the box.

These fart on* add up to probable cause to believe that
the black box contained contraband and validated a warrantless
search of the box.

No other legitimate explanati oi i for t he

presence, of all these* factors exists.
-15-

POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION BY THE TROOPERS WAS FOR
A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Defendant maintains that his detention for more than
two hours before arrest was unreasonable.

In United States v.

Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1982), the United States Supreme Court
declined "to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible
Terry stop....1'

I^i. at 709.

In a footnote the Court said, "Such

a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow
authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any
particular situation."

^d. at 709, f.n. 10 .

In the present case the troopers issued a citation for
speeding and then were seeking to verify whether defendant had
legal use of the car.

During this attempt to verify, which took

30-45 minutes, they developed probable cause to believe that
there was contraband in the box attached to the car.

Although

the officers at that point could have searched the box and
arrested defendant, they chose to seek a search warrant.

Their

efforts to find a prosecutor and a judge were pursued with all
due diligence.

Evidently, most of the judges were out of the

county and finding Judge Miller took some time (R. 181 at 44-45).
The troopers were not dilatory in trying to obtain a warrant, nor
did they use the time to continue searching the car or to "shake
down" the defendant.

The length of time used was reasonable in

light of what the troopers found, defendant's refusal to consent
to searching the box, and the attempts to find a prosecutor and a
judge to try to obtain a warrant.

_1 C_

POINT V
THE TROOPERS RELIED ON THE AUTHORIZATION OF A
MAGISTRATE TO CONDUCT THEIR SEARCH AND THUS
THEIR CONDUCT ARGUABLY FALLS WITHIN THE GOOD
FAITH EXCEPTION OF LEON,
Even though the troopers in this case had probable
cause to search the black box without a warrant, they did seek to
obtain oni1

linn1 noopeiK souqht OUT « prosecutor and a judge in

order to attempt to obtain a warrant.

Trooper Bagley gave

information to Judge Margaret Miller orally, with the assistance
of a Deputy Iroi i Coin ity Attorney, to support issuance of a
warrant,

This oral affidavit was transcribed and included in the

record (R. 180). After hearing the oral affidavit of the
trooper, Judge Mi J lei' gave verbal authorization for the troopers
to "continue with the search" (R. 180 at. 10). The validity of
the authorization was challenged by defendant, at the suppression
hearing (T

181 at

5-4).

It became clear at that time that no

written memorialization of the verbal authorization was ever made
(T. 181 at 5 ) . Counsel argued whether n seair-fi warrant had to be
a written order or i f a verbal order was sufficient (T. 181 at 510).

The trial court held that there was no search warrant in

this case (R. 181 at 12 and 62)

The tiial court asked for

memoranda on the application of the Hgoc >d faith exception" found
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1983).

After reviewing

the memoranda the cou11 f oand 1.11a i 1 in> t r oope r s ha«< probable
cause to search the black box so it did not address the Leon
issue (R. 18 1 at 041-046, See Addendum for a copy of that
decision).
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Even though the trial court did not rule in
respondent's favor on the Leon issue but instead found that the
officers had probable cause for a warrantless search, defendant
has brought the matter up on appeal.

Respondent maintains that,

arguably, the Leon doctrine could apply in this case.
This case is distinguishable from State v. Mendoza, 748
P.2d 181 (Utah 1987).

In the Mendoza case the officers made a

Terry stop without reasonable suspicion according to the Utah
Supreme Court.

The officers never tried to get a search warrant

but merely placed Mendoza under arrest then searched the car
incident to that arrest.

Since there was no reasonable suspicion

to stop the car under Terry, the actions of the officer in the
subsequent search were per se unreasonable.

The Court did

discuss the Leon rationale saying:
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), however,
the Court created an exception to blanket
application of the exclusionary rule. The
Court held that the rule does not apply where
the state establishes that an officer
exhibited "objectively reasonable" reliance
on a magistrate's probable cause
determination and on the technical
sufficiency of the search warrant issued.
Id. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21.
748 P.2d at 185.

They held that the Leon exception could not be

used in the Mendoza case saying:
[N]o outside authority on which the officers
could reasonably rely expressly authorized
the search of the vehicle; therefore, the
policy foundations of the Leon exception do
not appear in searches of the kind involved
in this case.
Id. at 185 (footnote omitted).

-18-

In the present case the argument can be made that the
troopei B dliiJ Bft'k an "outsule author i t.y
the search of the box.

whn expressly authorized

The question arises as to whether their

reliance was -objectively reasonable" but no finding on that
issue was made bv the trial court be h w .

Since the trial court

held that the search was warrantless but valid because based on
probable cause, the issue of good faith under Leon is not
paramount in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and matters addressed at oral
arguments, respondent requests that defendant's no contest plea
be affirmed.
DATED this

.4
P~\-

fW-flx
day of
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

, 1988.

V v U " ? r*"r).-/cy.

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE

J
I hezeby certify that on the J?\_

-

:

ctober, 1988,

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and exact
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84720.
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ADDENDUM

77-23-4. Examination of complainant and witnesses — Witness not
la physical presence of magistrate — Duplicate original warrants —
Return. (1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the issuance
of a search warrant shall be given on oath and either reduced to writing
or recorded verbatim. Transcription of the recorded testimony need not
precede the issuance of the warrant Any person having standing to contest
the search may request and shall be provided with a transcription of the
recorded testimony in support of the application for the warrant
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the absence
of an affidavit a search warrant may be issued upon sworn oral testimony
of a person who is not in the physical presence of the magistrate provided
the magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of
the warrant. The sworn orsl testimony msy be communicated to the magistrate by telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and
transcribed. After transcription, the statement shall be certified by the
magistrate and filed with the court. This statement shall be deemed to be
an affidavit for purposes of this section.
(s) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursuant to subsection (2) shsll be those required by this chapter. Prior to issuance of the warrant, the magistrate shall require the law enforcement
officer or the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the warrant to read
to him verbatim the contents of the warrant. The magistrate may direct
that specific modifications be made in the warrant. Upon approval, the
magistrate shall direct the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting
attorney for the government who is requesting the warrant to sign the
magistrate's name on the warrant. This warrant shall be called a duplicate
original warrant and shall be deemed a warrant for purposes of this chapter. In such cases the magistrate shall cause to be made an original warrant. The magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of the duplicate
original warrant on the face of the original warrant.
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the original warrant
shall be in conformity with this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate shall
require the person who gave the sworn oral testimony establishing the
grounds for issuance of the warrant to sign a copy of the transcript.
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue a search warrant.
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IN THb FIF'IH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATL OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

]

CHARLES LANGDON,

1

District Court No.

1187

Defendant.
Tnis matter

cane on before tne Court for decision on tne

17th day of May, 1988, on the Defendants Motion to Suppress.
Tne Court received and reviewed the briefs filed by the parties
and considered the proofs and arguments offered.
The Court finds the facts to be as follows:
Three

Utah

Highway

Patrol

troopers

were

en route

tro.r,

St. George to Cedar City on March 17, 1988, at about 1830 nours
(6:30 p.m.).
behind

The driving trooper noted two cars approaching from

travelling extremely

fast.

troopers to be travelling together.

Tne cars appeared

to the

As the troopers approacned

the middle interchange in Cedar City, they pulled off to the side
of the interstate and clocked the two vehicles by use of tneir
radar equipment.

The Defendant's vehicle was the second of tne

two cars and was travelling a little faster than the first.

It

was

clocked

at

71 miles per

hour

in a 65 miles per

hour

zone.

Tne troopers stopped the car.
Tne Defendant

produced

registration.

The

Defendant/driver.
might

have

been

car

Tne

stolen

Defendant/driver

and

his

identification
was

not

and the vehicle's

registered

trooper

became suspicious

because

it was

contained

very

not

to

that

the car

registered

little personal

the

to

the

effects

in

the car, a road atlas, and bedding.
The

trooper

asked

about

ownership

of

the

vehicle

and

a

telephone number to call to verify ownership or lawful possession
of

the

vehicle.

purported

While

owner

in

Defendant/driver
The Defendant
Go

ahead."

ignition, and

to

search

Lee

reply

was,

too* out

to the trunk.

to

call

tne

of

the

inquired

for weapons

His

the venicle,

directly

attempted

Trooper

the car

consented.

exited

went

dispatcner

California,

freely
He

the

or

contraband.

,f

l don't

the keys

Without

the

care.

from

the

trooper

saying anything, the Defendant/driver opened tne trunk.
Welded
the

rear

to the frame of the car below

bumper

and

the gas tank,

tne car, was a black box measuring
locked

by

a new

silver

padlock.

the trunk

in plain view
3M

x 3M

from

x 12M.

There were

and

underneatn

The box

no signs

grime, or road debris on the box or the lock.

between

of

was

dirt,

They appeared

to

be new and recently affixed to the vehicle.
Wnile the dispatcher was attempting

to contact the purported

owner of the car. Defendant had told the troopers that he had nad
the car

for about

a year

but did

-2-

not

know

the

locked

box

wos

there, nor did he have a key to the lock.

None of tne keys on

rings in Defendant's possession fit the lock
was later found in the car's jockey-box).

(although the key

Through a small crack

in the door of the box, it could be seen that something was
inside.
The dispatcher was called by telephone by someone purporting
to be the registered

owner who said

that Defendant did

have

permission to have the car, but that he (the purported caller)
did not know of the existence of the subject box either

and,

therefore, could not consent to its search.
The dispatcher had then attempted to contact Judge Miller,
who was tne only magistrate known to be in the area, the others
naving "been out-of-state.

It was Judge Miller's

husband's

birthday and tne dispatcner nad to take some time to locate ner.
Later she arrived at the Utan Highway Patrol offices and a searcn
warrant was verbally autnonzed by ner at 2040 hours (8:4l4 p.rr,.),
although a written warrant was never
venicle was moved off of the dark
"sa1ly-port" at the Correctional

issued.

Thereafter

tne

interstate to the lignted

Facility.

search ensued and the box was opened.

A more

tnorough

It was found to contain

cocaine.
The troopers reasonably believed that the vehicle contained
contraband, which belief was supported by these articulated facts
known to tne troopers at tne time of the search:
1.

Tne car was not registered to Defendant;

2.

Tne

vehicle

there was an a b s e n c e
inconsistent
Chicago

with

to look

3.

A

contained
of

personal

Defendant's

road

atlas

was

including

certain

areas near

Barstow,

George,

Utah,

Richfield,

and

high e n f o r c e m e n t

belonyed

b.
rear

Tnere

was

of

padlock

showing

indicia

of naving

6.
registered
the

Both

the

been

owner

x

of

and

those

said

and

as

were

netween

are

areas

that

later
nad

he

had

3"

x

the

said

its

1 2 " box

with

a

St.
of

car

he

was

possession

welded

brand

to

new

Defendant-driver
Knowledge

short

and

of

the

the

the

silver

road d i r t , g r e a s e , or

tnere but a very

denied

seat

years;

frame

no signs

the

and

them and

3"

doing;

patrol;

first

(1 1/2)
a

front

to

other

time;
purported

existence

of

box;
7.

The

exceptionally
generally
the

from

clothing

he was

the

Utah;

but

California

said

on

the highway

one-half

portion

from

California,

relatives,

the car

for one and

going

and

C h i c a g o , were m a r k e d ,

Defendant

his

to

purcnasing

by

luggage,

property

open

cities,

Tne

little

for w o r k , as he had

several

4.

a

car

was

good

physical

fitting

troopers

to

a
be

an

pattern
used

older
and

of

for

model,

mechanical

otner

vehicles

interstate

yet

in

shape,
known

to

transportation

of d r u g s ;
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8.

There

were

open

household

type

"stick-up"

room deodorizers in the trunk and tool kit; and
9.
box #

Through

it could

a small

be seen

opening

that

in the door

something

was

of

the

inside

the

box.
Therefore,

the

Court

concludes

tnat

the

troopers

had

probable cause to conduct a search.
Inasmuch

as

the

venule's

driver

was

troopers' suspicions, tne vehicle was stopped

alerted
on the

to

the

highway,

the vehicle was easily moveable, and the vehicle or its contents
might

never

troopers'
warrant

nave been
search

found again, the Court

falls

within

tne

"vehicle

concludes

that

exception"

tne

to the

requirements.

Having

so concluded

tnat tne troopers had probable cause to

searcn and that tne searcn was witnin the "vehicle exception" to
the warrant

requirement,

the Court

need

not

address

the

issues

relating to the Leon exception.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

3/^

day of May, 1988.

^ P H I L I P EtyfS
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy
the foregoing MEMORANDUM

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION

SUPPRESS to Mr. James L. Shumate, Attorney for Defendant, at P
Box 623, Cedar City, UT

84720, by first-class mail, post

fully prepaid, on this Q ^ ^ d a y

of May, 1988.
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linute Book No.
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immediatly.
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P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

CiF'K

Q&nJJLjuAshr^ZA, nrarr

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN,
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL,
AND ORDER

Plaint iff,
vs.

)

CHARLES LANGDON,

)

Defendant.

Criminal No.

1187

)

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN
•A

I, Charles Langdon, the above-named Defendant, under oath,

nereoy acknowledge tnat I nave entered a plea of no contest to
the cnarge of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE M T H
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE contained in the Information on file against
me in the above-entitled Court, a copy of which I nave received
and

read, and

I understand

the nature of tne elements of tne

offense for w m c h I am pleading no contest.
the cnarge

to wnich

Second-Degree
voluntarily
attorney,

1 furtner understand

this plea of no contest

Felony, and

that

I am

is entered

entering

such

is a

a p i «? H

and of my own free will after conferring with my
James

L.

Shumate,

and

witn

the

knowledge

understanding of the following facts:

1-Hi

and

<h J"
^

'

1.

I know that

I have constitutional

riqhts under the

Constitution of Utan and the United States to plead not guilty
and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I have entered
a plea of no contest, or to a trial by the Court should I elect
to waive

a trial

represented by

by

jury.

counsel and

I know

I nave

a rignt

to oe

that I am in fact represented

by

James L. Shumate.
I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court uoon the
charge, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against
me by having them testify in open court in my presence and before
the Court and jury witn the right to have those witnesses crossexamined by my attorney.

1 also know that 1 ha%je the right to

have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to testify
in Court upon my benalf and that 1 could, if I elected to do so,
testify in Court on my own benalf, and tnat if I choose not to do
so, the jury can and will be told

that this may not be neid

against me if I choose to nave the jury so instructed.

4 J
!

^, (r*

3.

I know that if 1 were to have a trial that tne State

must prove each and every element of the crime charged

to t;ie

satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; tnat
1 would have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; and tnat
any verdict rendered by a jury, whetner it be that of guilty or

c/

not guilty, must be by a unanimous agreement of jurors.
i 4.

I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of tne

United States that 1 have a right against self-incrimination or a
right not to give evidence against myself and that this means
-2-

that

I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any

crime and cannot be compelled

to testify

in Court upon trial

unless 1 choose to do so.
£,t/>%

5.

I know tnat under the Constitutions of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Court that I wojld
have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to tne Supreme
Court or Utan for review of the trial proceedings and that it I
could

not afford

to pay tne costs for such appeal, that tnose

costs would be paid by the State without cost to me, and to have
tne assistance of counsel on sucn appeal.
£ /

6.

I Know that if 1 wish to contest tne charge against ne,

I need only plead

w

not guilty" and tne matter will

be set for

trial, it wnich time the State of Utah will have the burden of
proving eacn element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
tne trial

is before a 3ury, tne verdict must be unanimous.

If
I

Know and understand tnat by entering a plea of no contest, I am
waiving my constitutional

rignts as set out in the precedino

paragrapns and tnat I am, in ract, fully incriminating myself.
£

f^

7.

I know that under tne laws of Utan the possible maximum

sentence th3t can and may be imposed upon my plea of no contest
to tne charge identified on page one of tnis Statement, and as
set out in the Information, are as follows:
(A)

iTprisonment in the Utan State Prison of not
less than one (1) year and not to exceed
fifteen years;

(B)

And/or fined in any amount not in excess of
ten tnousand dollars ($10,000.00);

-3-
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I further understand that tne imprisonment may be for consecutive
periods if my plea is to more than one charge.

I also know that

if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another
offense of which I have been convicted or to which 1 have pleaded
guilty, my plea

in the present

action may result

sentences being imposed on me.
by the Court

in consecutive

1 also know that I may be ordered

to mdke restitution

to any victim or victims of my

crimes.
/

^

8.

contest
fine

or

1 know that the fact
does not mean
sentence

of

that

that

I have entered

the Court

imprisonment

will not

upon me and

oeen made to me by anyone as to what

a ple3 of no

impose

eitner

no promises

the sentence will

be

a

nave
if I

plead no contest or tnat it will oe made lighter because or my no
contest plea.
^4/<*
have

9.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful

influence of any kind

been made to induce me to plead no contest, and no promises,

except those contained herein, have been made to me.

I know tnat

any opinions made to me, by my attorney or other persons, as to
what

he

or

they

believe

the

Court

may

ao

witn

respect

to

sentencing are not binding on tne Court.
/*

)

%

L/# fr *

10.

No promises of any kind have been made to induce me to

plead no contest.
concessions
sentences,

or

I am also aware that any charge or
recommendations

including a

for

reduction of

probation
the

or

sentencing
suspended

charge for sentencing

-4*
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made

or

sought

by eitner defense counsel

or the prosecutor

are

not binding on the Court and may not be approved or followed by
the Court.
/^J4

11.

I have read this Statement

by my attorney, and

I understand

or 1 nave had it read to me

its provisions.

I know that I

am free to change or delete anything contained in this Statement.
1 do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements
are correct.
/' (^

12.

I am s a t i s f i e d

with

the advice

and assistance of my

attorney.
13.

3 S

I am

tnrougn tne
Lnglisn

years

/

of

and

language.

age, I have attended

I can read and

I was not under

scnool

understand

the

the influence of any drugs,

medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter tne plea W3s
rr.ade.

I am not

presently

under

the

influence

of

any drugs,

medication or intoxicants.

£/•
t

14.

I believe

mentally

capable

of

myself

to be of sound

understanding

the

and discerning

proceedings

and

mind,
tne

consequences of my plea and tree of any mental disease, defect or
impairment

c

that would prevent me from knowingly,

intelligently

and voluntarily entering my plea.
9J

15.

I have discussed the contents of this Statement with my

attorney and ask the Court to accept my plea of no contest to the
charge

set forth in this Statement because, in tact, on or about

-5-

1,30

tne 17th day of Marcn, 1988, in Iron County, State of Utan, I
knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance, to
wit:

Cocaine, with the intent to distribute.
/

DATLD tnis

day ot *7T^W^

> 198b.

/#*&

A;^

CHARLES LANGDON
Defendant

y

CERTIFICATE OP DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify that 1 am the attorney for Cnarles Langdon, tne
Defendant named aoove, and I know ne has read the Statement, or
that I nave read

it to him; and

I discussed

it with him and

believe ne fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically competent.
and belief

To the best oi my knowledge

after an appropriate investigation, the elements of

the crime and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's
conduct are correctly

criminal

stated, and tnese, along witn tne other

representations and declarations made by the Defendant

in the

foregoing Statement, are accurate and true.

-^x
-V

z>
(rfbS L. SHUMATE
attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utan in
its case against Cnarles Langdon, Defendant,.

1 have reviewed tne

Statement

tne declarations,

of

the Defendant

and

find

that

including the elements of the offense and the factual synopsis of
-6-

the Defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense
are true and correct.

No improper

inducements, threats, or

coercions to encourage a plea have been offered to the Defendant.
The plea negotiations are fully contained in this Statement or *s
supplemented on the record before the Court.

There is reasonable

cause to believe the evidence would support the conviction of the
Defendant

for the offense for whicn tne plea

is entered and

acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest.

Iron County Attorney
ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement of
Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain and the foregoing Certificates
of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of no contest is
freely

and

voluntarily

made, and

it

is so ordered

tnat the

Defendant's plea of Mno contest" to the charge set forth in the
foregoing Statement be accepted and entered.
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed

this

/—

day OC-JL*V^*-~

, 1988.

G2*s€+—
Judge

-7-

before ne

